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Judgment in a Social Context:
Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation
I. Introduction
The mainstream of social cognition research can be described as the application of principles and 
methods of cognitive psychology to social stimuli. While the information processing paradigm, to 
which social cognition research is committed (Ostrom, 1984), stimulated an enormous research 
productivity in social psychology, it has frequently been criticized as being asocial in nature. In the 
eyes of many critics, its concentration on individuals as isolated information processors fostered a 
neglect o f the social context in which human judgment occurs, prompting Schneider (1991, p. 553) 
to ask, "Where, oh where, is the social in social cognition?". As Forgas (1981, p.3) observed, 
following the adoption of the information processing paradigm "social psychology found itself 
transformed into a field now mainly concerned not with human social action, but with human beings 
as thinkers and information processors about social stimuli." However, even the study of "human 
beings as thinkers and information processors" is likely to suffer from this neglect. On close 
inspection, it seems that much of what we consider to reflect biases in human judgment, artifacts in 
attitude measurement, and so on, may actually reflect researchers* ignorance regarding the 
conversational context of human judgment, rather than serious shortcomings on the side of our 
subjects. Accordingly, social cognition research may greatly benefit from a fuller consideration of the 
social context in which humans conduct much of their thinking about social as well as non-social 
stimuli. A promising starting point for this endeavor is provided by psycholinguistic work into the 
tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversation in everyday life.
The present chapter reviews these tacit assumptions and explores some of their implications 
for social cognition research. At present, social cognition researchers have primarily paid attention 
to conversational aspects of human judgment in exploring attribution processes (e.g., Hilton & 
Slugoski, 1986; Edwards & Potter, 1993) and the impact of different audiences on the encoding and 
recall of person information (e.g., Higgins, McCann, &Fondacaro, 1982; Higgins & Rholes, 1978). 
Given that excellent reviews of that work are available (see Hilton, 1990, 1991; McCann & Higgins, 
1992), the present chapter focuses on the contribution of conversational processes to the emergence 
of biases and shortcomings in human judgment, drawing on research in judgment and decision 
making, attitude measurement, and questionnaire construction.
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II . The Logic of Conversation 
As Clark and Schober (1992, p. 15) noted, it is a "common misperception that language use has 
primarily to do with words and what they mean. It doesn’t. It has primarily to do with people and 
what they mean. It is essentially about speakers* intentions." Determining a speakers’ intention, 
however, requires extensive inferences on the part of listeners. Similarly, designing an utterance to 
be understood by a given listener requires extensive inferences on the side of the speaker. In making 
these inferences, speakers and listeners rely on a set of tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of 
conversation in everyday life. In their most widely known form, these assumptions have been 
expressed as four maxims by Paul Grice (1975), a philosopher of language. Subsequent researchers 
have elaborated on these assumptions, specifying their implications for speakers and listeners (see 
Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schober, 1992; Higgins, 1981; Higgins, Fondacaro, & McCann, 
1982; Levinson, 1983).
The Logic of Conversation in Everyday Life
A maxim of manner asks speakers to make their contribution such that it can be understood 
by their audience. To do so, speakers do not only need to avoid ambiguity and wordiness, but have 
to take the characteristics of their audience into account, designing their utterance in a way that the 
audience can figure out what they mean -  and speakers are reasonably good at doing so (Krauss & 
Fussel, 1991). At the heart of this process are speakers’ assumptions about the information that they 
share with recipients, that is, the common ground (Schiffer, 1972; Stalnaker, 1978). Listeners, in 
turn, assume that the speaker observes this maxim and interpret the speaker’s utterance against what 
they assume to constitute the common ground (e. g., Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Fussel & 
Krauss, 1989a,b). Whereas the initial assumptions about the common ground are based on the 
participants’ assumptions about their cultural and personal background, each successful contribution 
to the conversation extends the common ground of the participants, reflecting that "in orderly 
discourse, common ground is cumulative" (Clark & Schober, 1992, p. 19).
This cumulative nature of the common ground reflects, in part, the operation of a maxim of 
relation that enjoins speakers to make all contributions relevant to the aims of the ongoing 
conversation. This maxim entitles listeners to use the context of an utterance to disambiguate its 
meaning by making bridging inferences (Clark, 1977). Moreover, this maxim implies that speakers 
are unlikely to assume that a contribution to a conversation is irrelevant to its goal, unless it is marked 
as such. As Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. vi) noted, "communicated information comes with a 
guarantee of relevance" and if in doubt, it is the listener’s task to determine the intended meaning of 
the utterance by referring to the common ground or by asking for clarification.
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In addition, a maxim of quantity requires speakers to make their contribution as informative 
as is required, but not more informative than is required. That is, speakers should respect the 
established, or assumed, common ground by providing the information that recipients need, without 
reiterating information that recipients already have (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Prince, 1981). Finally, 
a maxim of quality enjoins speakers not to say anything they believe to be false or lack adequate 
evidence for.
Table 1: Rules of the Communication Game 
Communicators should:
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1. take the recipient’s characteristics into account;
2 . try to be understood (i.e., be coherent and comprehensible);
3. give neither too much nor too little information;
4. be relevant;
5. produce a message that is appropriate lo the context and the circumstanccs;
6. produce a message that is appropriate to their communicative intent or purpose;
7. convey the truth as they see it;
8. assume that the recipient is trying, aa much as possible, lo follow the rules of the communication game. 
Recipients should:
1. take the communicator’s characteristics into account;
2. determine the communicator’s communicative intent or purporse;
3. take the context and circumstances into account;
4. pay attention to the message and be prepared to receive it;
5. try to understand the message;
6. provide feedback, when possible, to the communicator concerning their understanding of the message.
Note. Adapted from McCann, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1992). Personal end contextual factors in communication: A review 
of the ’communication game’. In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, interaction, and social cognition (pp. 144-172). 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Reprinted by permission.
Table 1, adapted from McCann and Higgins (1992), summarizes the implications of these 
maxims in the form of "rules" that speakers and listeners are supposed to follow. These rules apply 
most directly to situations in which participants attempt to exchange information or to get things done. 
Obviously, conversations may be characterized by other goals (see Higgins, Fondacaro, & McCann, 
1981), such as entertaining one another, in which case participants may not assume that the usual 
conversational maxims are observed. Given that the present chapter is concerned with conversational 
processes in research settings, however, the adjustments required by different conversational goals
do not need further elaboration. In general, research participants are likely to perceive the research 
situation as a task oriented setting in which participants attempt to exchange information as accurately 
as possible, thus rendering the assumptions underlying task oriented conversations highly relevant.
In summary, according to the tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversation in 
daily life, "communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance" (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, p. vi) and listeners are entitled to assume that the speaker tries to be informative, truthful, 
relevant, and clear. Moreover, listeners interpret the speakers’ utterances "on the assumption that they 
are trying to live up to these ideals" (Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 122)1.
The Logic of Conversation in Research Settings
What, then, are the implications of these tacit assumptions for communicative processes in 
research situations, most notably psychological experiments and survey interviews? As many 
researchers have noted (e.g., Clark & Schober, 1992; Strack, in press; Strack & Schwarz, 1992), 
"conversations" in research settings differ from natural conversations by being highly constrained. 
Whereas speakers and addressees collaborate in unconstrained natural conversations "to establish 
intended word meanings, intended interpretations of full utterances, implications of utterances, 
mutually recognized purposes, and many other such things" (Clark & Schober, 1992, p. 25), their 
opportunity to do so is severely limited in research settings, due to the researcher’s attempt to 
standardize the interaction. Most importantly, the standardization of instructions, or of the questions 
asked, precludes that the utterances can be tailored to meet different common grounds. Moreover, 
when research participants ask for clarification, they may often not receive additional information. 
Rather, the previously given instructions may be repeated or a well-trained interviewer may respond, 
"Whatever it means to you", when asked to clarify a question’s meaning. In some cases, as when a 
respondent is asked to complete a self-administered questionnaire, there may also be nobody who can 
be asked for clarification. As a result, a mutual negotiation of intended meaning is largely precluded 
in many research situations.
Nevertheless, research participants will attempt to cooperate by determining the intended 
meaning of the researcher’s contributions to the constrained conversation. To do so, they will rely 
even more on the tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversation in daily life than they 
would under less constrained conditions. And these assumptions grant them every right to do so. That 
communicators are supposed to design their utterances such that they will be understood by addressees
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1 For an introduction to other aspects of conversational conduct, including nonverbal 
behavior, see Chapter 2 of Argyle, 1992,
implies an interpretability presumption, as Clark and Schober (1992, p. 27) noted. This presumption 
is emphasized by the fact that the researcher as communicator obviously does not foresee any 
difficulties with the comprehensibility of his or her utterances, or else he or she would have taken 
appropriate precautions. As a result, research participants will refer to the conversational maxims in 
inferring the researcher’s intended meaning. Hence, they will assume that every contribution of the 
researcher is relevant to the aims of the ongoing conversation; that every contribution is informative, 
truthful, and clear; and they will refer to the context of the conversation to resolve any ambiguities 
that may arise.
Unfortunately, however, research participants are bound to miss one crucial point: Whereas 
the researcher is likely to comply with conversational maxims in almost any conversation he or she 
conducts outside of a research setting, the researcher is much less likely to do so in the research 
setting itself. In fact, the researcher may violate each and every maxim of conversation by providing 
information that is neither relevant, nor truthful, informative and clear -- and may have explicitly 
designed the situation to suggest otherwise. Research participants, however, have no reason to suspect 
that the researcher is not a cooperative communicator and are hence likely to work hard at finding 
meaning in the researcher’s contributions.
The findings reviewed below suggest that this basic misunderstanding about the cooperative 
nature of communication in research settings has contributed to some of the more puzzling findings 
in social and psychological research and is, in part, responsible for the less than flattering picture of 
human judgmental abilities that has emerged from social cognition research.
III. Communicated Information Comes with a Guarantee of Relevance
One of the key assumptions underlying the conduct of conversation holds that all information 
contributed by participants is relevant to the goal of the ongoing conversation. As noted above, 
research participants have no reason to assume that this maxim of relevance does not hold in a formal 
research setting. Accordingly, they assume that all information offered to them by the researcher is 
relevant to their task -- and will work hard at making sense of it. This implicit guarantee of relevance 
contributes in important ways to several pervasive biases that have been documented in judgment 
research and underlies many apparent "artifacts" in attitude and opinion measurement that have 
captured the attention of survey methodologists.
A. The Conversational Relevance of "Irrelevant" Information: If the Experimenter Presents It,
I Should Use It
Social psychologists have long been intrigued by subjects’ readiness to rely on individuating
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information of little diagnostic value at the expense of more diagnostic information. Prominent 
examples of this general bias include the neglect of information about situational factors in explaining 
the behavior of an actor and the underutilization of base-rate information. As most robust phenomena, 
both of these biases are likely to have many determinants, as Ross and Nisbett (1991) noted. 
Nevertheless, several studies indicate that the conversational guarantee of relevance contributes to a 
considerable degree to the size of the typically obtained effects.
1. The Underutilization of Base-Rates
Numerous studies have demonstrated a pronounced bias to rely on individuating information 
of little diagnostic value at the expense of more diagnostic base-rate information (see Nisbett & Ross, 
1980, for a review). Although the initial conclusion that individuating information will typically 
overwhelm the impact of base-rate information (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Nisbett & 
Borgida, 1975) has been called into question by subsequent studies (see Ginossar & Trope, 1987, for 
a review), the frequently observed underutilization of base-rate information has continued to be a key 
topic in judgment and decision research. An analysis of the experimental procedures used indicates, 
however, that the often dramatic findings are, in part, a function of conversational processes rather 
than of features naturally inherent to base-rate or individuating information.
In what is probably the best-known demonstration of base-rate neglect, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) told their subjects that a target person described to them "shows no interest in political 
and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, 
sailing, and mathematical puzzles". These subjects predicted that the target person is most likely an 
engineer, independently of whether the base-rate probability for any target being an engineer was .30 
or .70. An analysis of the instructions used in this study proves informative. Specifically, the 
instructions read (emphases added):
"A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 (resp., 
70) engineers and 70 (resp, 30) lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis 
of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been 
written. You will find on your forms five descriptions, chosen at random from the 100 
available descriptions. For each description, please indicate your probability that the person 
described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100.
The same task has been performed by a panel of experts who were highly accurate 
in assigning probabilities to the various descriptions. You will be paid a bonus to the extent 
that your estimates come close to those of the expert panel."
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The first part of the instructions informs subjects that the individuating information was 
compiled by psychologists on the basis of respected procedures of their profession, namely interviews 
and tests. Given that lay-persons assume psychologists to be experts on issues of personality (rather 
than base-rates), this introduction emphasizes the relevance of the individuating information. 
Moreover, other experts -- most likely psychologists as well, given the present context — are said to 
be highly accurate in making these judgments, thus further increasing the relevance of the 
individuating information. The subjects’ task is then defined as determining a probability that matches 
the judgments of the experts. If these experts are assumed to be psychologists, subjects can infer that 
the experimenter wants them to use the same information that these experts used — which is most 
likely the personality information compiled by their colleagues.
Finally, as the experiment proceeds, subjects are asked to judge several target persons for 
whom different individuating information is presented. The base-rate information about the sample 
from which the targets are drawn, on the other hand, is held constant. This further suggests that the 
individuating information is of crucial importance because this information provides different clues 
for each judgment and in the absence of this information all tasks would have the same solution. 
Thus, the instructions and procedures of Kahneman and Tversky’s classic study allowed subjects to 
infer (however incorrectly) the experimenter’s intention that they should base their judgment on the 
individuating information. It therefore comes as little surprise that subjects relied on it when making 
their judgments. After all, they had no reason to assume that the experimenter violated each and every 
of the Gricean maxims by providing information that is neither relevant, nor truthful, informative and 
clear.
To test this conversational analysis of the base-rate fallacy, Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and 
Naderer (1991, Experiment 1) tried to undermine the guarantee of relevance that characterizes human 
communication in a modified partial replication of Kahneman and Tversky’s study. Some subjects 
were told that the person description was written by a psychologist, replicating the instructions used 
by Kahneman and Tversky. This entitles the recipient to assume that the presented information obeys 
the normative rules of communication and reflects a particular communicative intention on the part 
of the experimenter. Other subjects were told that the (identical) description was compiled by a 
computer that drew a random sample of descriptive sentences bearing on the target person. Obviously, 
the co-operative principle does not directly apply to the resulting communication and the 
communicative intention cannot be unambiguously inferred. While the database from which the 
computer drew the sentences was said to have been compiled by psychologists, the collection drawn 
by the computer is of dubious relevance.
As expected, undermining the implicit guarantee of relevance greatly attenuated subjects’
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reliance on the individuating information. Specifically, subjects in the replication condition estimated 
the likelihood of the target being an engineer as .76, despite a low base-rate of .30. However, when 
the same information was allegedly selected by a computer, their likelihood estimate dropped to .40. 
This attenuation indicates that subjects’ reliance on individuating information at the expense of base- 
rate information reflects, in part, their assumption that the experimenter is a cooperative 
communicator who does not present information that is irrelevant to the task at hand. Accordingly, 
they tried to find "relevance” in the information provided to them, unless the implicit guarantee of 
relevance was called into question.
In a similar vein, Krosnick, Li, and Lehman (1990) observed that the utilization of base-rate 
information varied as a function of the order in which the base-rate and the individuating information 
were presented. In seven studies, using a variety of different problems, subjects were more likely to 
use base-rate information when this information was presented after rather than before the 
individuating information. On first glance, such a recency effect may suggest that the information 
presented last was more accessible in memory. However, recall data and other manipulations rendered 
this interpretation implausible (see Krosnick et al., 1990). Rather, the emergence of this recency effect 
could be traced to the operation of conversational conventions. As Krosnick et al. (1990, p. 1141) 
suggested, subjects who first receive base-rate information and are subsequently provided with 
individuating information may reason, ’’The first piece of information I was given (i. e., the base-rate) 
has clear implications for my judgment, so it was sufficient. A speaker should only give me additional 
information if it is highly relevant and informative, so the experimenter must believe that the 
individuating information should be given special weight in my judgment." This reasoning would not 
only imply the general guarantee of relevance addressed above, but would also reflect the 
conversational convention to present the more informative and important information later in an 
utterance, in part to direct listeners’ attention to it (see Clark, 1985, pp. 222-224). In turn, listeners 
may assume that “information presented later is more important and should be the focus of their 
attention" (Krosnick et al., 1990, p. 1141). If so, the individuating information may be rendered 
particularly relevant in the conversational context if presented after rather than before the base-rate 
information.
Several findings support this assumption. In one of their studies, Krosnick et al. (1990, 
Experiment 4) observed that base-rate information had a more pronounced impact when the base-rate 
was presented after rather than before the individuating information. However, this recency effect was 
largely eliminated when subjects were informed that the order in which both pieces of information 
were presented was determined at random. Thus, subjects were likely to rely on the information 
presented last, unless the informational value of presentation order was called into question.
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Moreover, this order effect only emerged when the base-rate information contradicted the implications 
of the individuating information. In this case, subjects gave more weight to whatever information was 
presented last, suggesting that the presentation order may carry information about the relative 
importance that the communicator wants to convey.
To provide direct evidence for this assumption, Krosnick et al. (1990, Experiment 7) asked 
subjects to complete the blanks in a transcript of a conversation concerned with buying a car. In the 
base-rate last condition, the crucial part of this transcript read,
"My brother-in-law has had one problem after another with his Saab ._____ a car magazine
survey found Saabs have a better repair record than Volvos. Considering all this, I decided
to buy a ______ . I think that is the better choice."
In contrast, in the base-rate first condition the transcript read,
"A car magazine survey found Saabs have a better repair record than V olvos._____
my brother-in-law has had one problem after another with his Saab. Considering all 
this, I decided to buy a ________ . I think that is the better choice."
As expected on the basis of conversational conventions, most subjects completed the blanks 
in a way that implied that the speaker considered the second piece of information as more relevant 
than the first piece. Moreover, most of these subjects assumed that the speaker decided to buy the car 
favored by the second piece of information.
In combination, the findings of the Schwarz et al. (1991) and Krosnick et al. (1990) studies 
indicate that subjects based their judgment primarily on the information that corresponded to the 
inferred communicative intention of the communicator. In the Schwarz et al. (1991) study, subjects 
were more likely to rely on the individuating information if it was presented by a human 
communicator, who they could expect to comply with conversational norms, rather than drawn by 
a computer. Similarly, in the Krosnick et al. (1990) studies, subjects gave differential weight to base- 
rate and to individuating information depending on its apparent importance to the communicator, as 
conveyed by the presentation order chosen. In both cases, it was not the nature of the presented 
information per se that determined its impact, but rather its perceived relevance in a given 
conversational context. The same theme is echoed in research on another well-known judgmental bias, 
namely the fundamental attribution error.
2. The Fundamental Attribution Error
Numerous studies in the domain of person perception have documented a pronounced 
readiness to account for an actor’s behavior in terms of his or her dispositions, even under conditions
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where the actor has responded to obvious situational pressures (see Jones, 1990; Ross & Nisbett,
1991, for reviews). Following a classic study by Jones and Harris (1967), this so called 
"correspondence bias” (Jones, 1990) or "fundamental attribution error" (Ross, 1977) is typically 
investigated in an attitude-attribution paradigm. In most studies, subjects are provided an essay that 
advocates a certain position and are asked to infer the author’s attitude. Depending on experimental 
condition, they are either informed that the position taken in the essay was freely chosen by the author 
or was assigned by the experimenter. Whereas the content of the essay is presumably diagnostic for 
the author’s attitude under free choice conditions, it is not under assignment conditions. Nevertheless, 
subjects typically attribute attitudes to the author that reflect the position taken in the essay, even 
under conditions where this position was assigned.
Whereas findings of this type are usually interpreted as evidence for a pervasive "dispositional 
bias", subjects seem quite aware that the essay is of little diagnostic value under no-choice conditions. 
For example, Miller, Schmidt, Meyer, and Colella (1984) observed that a majority of their subjects 
explicitly reported that the essay written under no-choice conditions did not provide useful information 
about the author’s true attitude. Nevertheless, the same subjects proceeded to make attitude 
attributions in line with the assigned position advocated in the essay. As Wright and Wells (1988) 
suggested, a violation of conversational norms on the side of the experimenter seems to contribute 
to this finding. Specifically, Wright and Wells (1988, p. 184) noted that "the direction and content 
of the essay in the critical no-choice condition are irrelevant to the correct solution of the attribution 
task because the external constraints are sufficient to account for the essayist’s behavior. ” The 
experimenter nevertheless provides subjects with an essay, thus violating the maxim of relevance. 
However, subjects have no reason to expect that this maxim is violated and are thus likely to assume 
"that the experimenter believes that the essay has some diagnostic value (otherwise, why were they 
given the essay?)" (Wright & Wells, 1988, p. 184). Accordingly, they take the essay into 
consideration in making attitude attributions, resulting in an apparent dispositional bias.
To test this conversational account, Wright and Wells conducted an attitude-attribution study 
in which subjects were exposed to a pro or a con essay, allegedly written under choice or no-choice 
conditions. However, in addition to the standard procedure, their study involved a condition designed 
to undermine the implicit guarantee of relevance. Subjects in this condition were told that "the 
information packages and questionnaire items being given to subjects (...) were being randomly 
selected from a larger pool of information packages and questions. Thus, their pool might not include 
sufficient information for them to answer some of their questions. Moreover, their information 
package might contain some information that was not germane to some of their questions" (Wright 
& Wells, 1988, p. 185). As expected, this manipulation significantly reduced the emerging
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dispositional bias relative to the standard conditions in which subjects could assume that all the 
information provided to them is relevant to the task at hand. Moreover, the impact of undermining 
the guarantee of relevance was limited to the theoretically relevant no-choice conditions, and the 
above manipulation did not affect subjects’ inferences from essays written under free choice. Hence, 
undermining the guarantee of relevance did not result in generally more cautious judgments. Rather, 
it set subjects free to rely on the information that they themselves considered diagnostic, without 
having to find “relevance" in the information provided by the experimenter.
Similar processes are likely to contribute to some extent to findings that suggest that the 
impact of highly diagnostic information is "diluted" by the addition of less diagnostic information (e. 
g., Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; seeTetlock & Boettger, 1989). To the extent that information 
presented by the experimenter comes with a guarantee of "relevance”, subjects are likely to consider 
it in forming a judgment ~  not because they would find the information per se utterly informative, 
but because the sheer fact that it was presented to them indicates that it is somehow "relevant".
3. Conclusions
As the reviewed studies indicate, some of the biases that have received considerable attention 
in social cognition research may be less likely to reflect genuine shortcomings of the judgmental 
process than has typically been assumed. In fact, subjects often seem quite aware that the normatively 
irrelevant information is of little informational value. Nevertheless, they typically proceed to use it 
in making a judgment. As the above studies suggest, however, this may often reflect a violation of 
conversational norms by the experimenter, rather than any inherently flawed reasoning by subjects. 
Subjects have no reason to assume that the experimenter would intentionally provide information that 
is uninformative and irrelevant to the task at hand, thus violating the tacit rules that govern the 
conduct of conversation in everyday life. Accordingly, they proceed on the basis of the assumption 
that the experimenter is a cooperative communicator and work hard at making sense of the 
information provided to them. Once the implicit guarantee of relevance is called into question, 
however, the impact of normatively irrelevant information is largely reduced.
This analysis suggests that the typical procedures used in social cognition research are likely 
to result in an overestimation of the size and the pervasiveness of judgmental biases. This analysis 
does not imply, however, that violations of conversational norms are the sole source of judgmental 
biases. Like most robust phenomena, judgmental biases are likely to have many determinants (see 
Ross & Nisbett, 1992). If we are to understand their operation in natural contexts, however, we need 
to ensure that their emergence in laboratory experiments does not reflect the operation of determinants 
that are unlikely to hold in other settings.
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B. Making Sense or Ambiguous Questions
Whereas the preceding research examples pertained to the impact of explicit assertions of little 
informational value, subjects’ judgments have been found to be equally biased by the presuppositions 
conveyed by a researcher’s question. This misleading impact of questions has received considerable 
attention in research on public opinion measurement and eyewitness testimony. As the studies 
reviewed in this section illustrate, however, the biasing effects of questions are again mediated by 
researchers’ violations of conversational norms and respondents’ erroneous assumption that the 
questioner is a cooperative communicator.
1. Answering Questions About Fictitious Issues
Public opinion researchers have long been concerned that the "fear of appearing uninformed" 
may induce "many respondents to conjure up opinions even when they had not given the particular 
issue any thought prior to the interview" (Erikson, Luttberg, & Tedin, 1988, p. 44). To explore how 
meaningful respondents’ answers are, survey researchers introduced questions about highly obscure 
or even completely fictitious issues, such as the "Agricultural Trade Act of 1978" (e.g., Bishop, 
Tuchfarber, & Oldendick, 1986; Schuman & Presser, 1981). Presumably, respondents’ willingness 
to report an opinion on a fictitious issue casts some doubt on the reports provided in survey interviews 
in general. In fact, about 30% to 50% of the respondents do typically provide an answer to issues that 
are invented by the researcher. This has been interpreted as evidence for the operation of social 
pressure that induces respondents to give answers, which are presumably based on a "mental flip of 
coin" (Converse, 1964, 1970). Rather than providing a meaningful opinion, respondents are assumed 
to generate some random response, apparently confirming social scientists’ wildest nightmares.
From a conversational point of view, however, these responses may be more meaningful than 
has typically been assumed in public opinion research. From this point of view, the sheer fact that 
a question about some issue is asked presupposes that this issue exists -  or else asking a question 
about it would violate the norms of cooperative conduct. Respondents, however, have no reason to 
assume that the researcher would ask meaningless questions and will hence try to make sense of it 
(see Strack & Martin, 1987, for a general discussion of respondents’ tasks). If the question is highly 
ambiguous, and the interviewer does not provide additional clarification, respondents are likely to turn 
to the context of the ambiguous question to determine its meaning, much as they would be expected 
to do in any other conversation. Once respondents have assigned a particular meaning to the issue, 
thus transforming the fictitious issue into a better defined issue that makes sense in the context of the 
interview, they may have no difficulty in reporting a subjectively meaningful opinion. Even if they
have not given the particular issue much thought, they may easily identify the broader set of issues 
to which this particular one apparently belongs. If so, they can use their general attitude toward the 
broader set of issues to determine their attitude toward this particular one.
A study by Strack, Schwarz, and Wanke (1991, Experiment 1) illustrates this point In this 
study, German college students were asked to report their attitude toward an "educational 
contribution". For some subjects, this target question was preceded by a question that asked them to 
estimate the average tuition fees that students have to pay at U.S. universities (in contrast to Germany, 
where university education is free). Others had to estimate the amount of money that the Swedish 
government pays every student as financial support. As expected, students’ attitude toward an 
"educational contribution" was more favorable when the preceding question referred to money that 
students receive from the government than when it referred to tuition fees. Subsequently, respondents 
were asked what the "educational contribution" implied. Content analyses of respondents’ definitions 
of the fictitious issue clearly demonstrated that respondents used the context of the "educational 
contribution" question to determine its meaning.
Thus, respondents turned to the content of related questions to determine the meaning of an 
ambiguous one. In doing so, they interpreted the ambiguous question in a way that made sense of it, 
and subsequently provided a subjectively meaningful response to their definition of the question. 
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that responses to fictitious issues do no£ conform to a model of 
mental coin flipping as Converse and other early researchers hypothesized, but do show a meaningful 
and systematic pattern, as Schuman and Kalton (1985) observed. What is at the heart of reported 
opinions about fictitious issues is not that respondents are willing to give subjectively meaningless 
answers, but that researchers violate conversational rules by asking meaningless questions in a context 
that suggests otherwise. And much as has been observed in response to useless information presented 
in psychological experiments, survey respondents work hard at finding meaning in the questions 
asked.
2. Leading Questions
In a highly influential program of research, Loftus and collaborators (e.g., Loftus, 1975; see 
Loftus, 1979, for a review) demonstrated a pronounced impact of the presuppositions conveyed by 
leading questions on subjects’ memory. For example, subjects were shown a brief film clip and 
subsequently had to answer questions about what they saw. For some subjects, the questions included, 
"Did you see the children getting on the school bus?", although no school bus was shown in the film. 
One week later, these subjects were more likely to erroneously remember having seen the school bus 
presupposed in the leading question than subjects who were not exposed to the question (Loftus, 1975,
Logic of Conversation 15
Experiment 4). Findings of this type have typically been interpreted as indicating that "a 
presupposition of unknown truthfulness will likely be treated as fact, incorporated into memory, and 
subsequently ’known’ to be true” (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980, p. 695).
Not surprisingly, such biasing effects of leading questions received considerable attention in 
applied research into eyewitness testimony. Several studies suggest, however, that the applied 
implications of this line of work may be more limited than has been assumed. In most experiments, 
the leading question is asked by the experimenter and subjects have no reason to assume that the 
experimenter may lead them astray by knowingly introducing unwarranted presuppositions, thus 
violating conversational norms. In an actual courtroom setting, on the other hand, people may be 
quite aware that communicators may follow their own agenda, may be motivated to introduce 
misleading information, and may be all but cooperative. Hence, the impact of leading questions may 
be restricted to conditions under which the questioner is assumed to be a cooperative communicator.
In line with this assumption, Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) observed biasing effects of leading 
questions about an observed car accident when the source of the question was the researcher, but not 
when the source was said to be the defendant’s lawyer (Experiment 1) or the driver of the car who 
caused the accident (Experiment 2). Thus, the otherwise obtained biasing effects of leading questions 
were "canceled by attributing the verbal material to a source that may be presumed to be biased" 
(Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980, p. 701), calling the source’s cooperativeness into question. Similarly, 
Smith and Ellsworth (1987) only obtained a biasing effect of leading questions when the questioner 
was assumed to be familiar with the event that the subject had witnessed. When the questioner was 
assumed to be unfamiliar with the event, the presupposition was discounted and no impact of the 
leading question was obtained.
Whereas Loftus’s research program focused mainly on the impact of leading questions on 
reconstructive memory, other researchers explored the impact of leading questions on impression 
formation. Their findings reiterate the same theme. For example, in an exploration of incrimination 
through innuendo, Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, and Beattie (1981) observed that media questions of 
the type, "Is Jane using drugs?", may quickly become public answers. Again, recipients infer that 
there must be some evidence that triggered the question in the first place — or why else would 
someone raise it? Here, as well as in Loftus’s research program, the impact of the presupposition 
conveyed by the question rests on the implicit assumption that the communicator is cooperative, as 
a study by Swann, Giuliano, and Wegner (1982) illustrates. In their study, subjects observed how a 
questioner asked a respondent a leading question of the type, "What would you do to liven things up 
at a party?" As expected, subjects considered the question to provide conjectural evidence that the 
person asked is an extrovert — unless they were told that the questions had been drawn from a
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fishbowl, thus undermining the implicit guarantee of relevance2.
In combination, these studies indicate that theoretical accounts of the processes underlying the 
impact of leading questions have to take the assumed cooperativeness of the questioner into account. 
By themselves, the implications conveyed by the leading question are not sufficient to affect subjects’ 
judgments or recollections. Rather, subjects only rely on the conveyed presuppositions if they can 
assume that the speaker has access to the relevant knowledge and is a cooperative communicator who 
complies with the Gricean maxims. Only under those conditions can they expect the communicator 
to provide information that is informative, truthful, relevant, and clear. From this perspective, the 
robustness of leading question effects under laboratory conditions is not surprising: As the preceding 
sections of this chapter illustrated, subjects typically assume that the experimenter is a cooperative 
communicator and are hence likely to rely on the implications conveyed by the experimenter’s 
questions. Moreover, the experimenter is presumably a particularly knowledgeable source -- after all, 
who would be more likely to know what was presented in the stimulus materials? By the same token, 
however, leading questions may provide less of a problem in natural settings, in which "there is often 
a basis to believe that the interrogator does not know the facts and is likely to have reasons to 
mislead" (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980, p. 696).
C. Formal Features of Questionnaires
Whereas the preceding examples pertained to explicitly presented verbal material, research 
participants do not only apply the tacit assumptions of daily conversations to the verbal content of 
questions. Rather, they also assume that any other aspect of the question asking process is "relevant" 
to the task at hand, including formal features of the questionnaire. As a result, formal features of 
questionnaire construction, such as the specific numeric values presented as part of a rating scale or 
the range of response alternatives presented as part of a behavioral frequency question, may strongly 
influence the obtained responses, as the following examples illustrate (see Schwarz & Hippier, 1991, 
for a more extended review).
1. The Numeric Values of Rating Scales
According to measurement theory, a 7-point rating scale is a 7-point rating scale, independent 
of how the seven points are graphically represented in the layout of the questionnaire. What
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2 Similar considerations apply to the inferences drawn from explicit assertions or 
denials; see Gruenfeld & Wyer, 1992; Hams & Monaco, 1978; Wegner et al., 1981.
psychologists care about is the wording of the question and the nature of the labels used to anchor 
the endpoints of the scale (see Dawes & Smith, 1985, for a review), but not the lay-out in which the 
scale is presented. For example, a 7-point scale that ranges from 1 to 7 should result in the same data 
pattern as a 7-point scale that ranges from -3 to +3, or a scale that presents seven unnumbered boxes, 
as long as the same verbal endpoint labels are used.
Empirically, however, the specific numerical values used may strongly affect the obtained 
responses, as Schwarz, Knauper, Hippier, Noelle-Neumann, and Clark (1991, Experiment 1) 
observed. As part of a larger survey, a representative sample of German adults was asked, "How 
successful would you say you have been in life?". This question was accompanied by an 11-point 
rating scale, with the endpoints labeled "not at all successful" and "extremely successful”. In one 
condition the numeric values of the rating scale ranged from 0 ("not at all successful") to 10 
("extremely successful"), whereas in the other condition they ranged from -5 ("not at al successful") 
to + 5  ("extremely successful"). The results showed a dramatic impact of the numeric values used, 
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: The Impact of Numeric Scale Values on Reports Along Rating Scales
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0 to 10 Scale -5 to +5  Scale
Scale Percentage Cumulative Scale Percentage
Cumulative
Value Value
0 - - -5 1 1
1 - - ■4 - 1
2 2 2 -3 1 2
3 5 7 -2 1 3
4 7 14 -1 1 4
5 20 34 0 9 13
6 14 48 + 1 9 22
7 20 68 +2 23 45
8 20 88 + 3 35 80
9 6 94 +4 14 94
10 3 97 +5 4 98
Undecided 3 100 Undecided 2 100
N 480 N 552
Note. Percentages rounded; Chi2(10) = 105.1, £ <  .0001. Data based on a quota sample of 1032 German adults, randomly 
assigned to conditions (Source: IfD 5007, Juli 198B). Adapted from Schwarz, N., Knauper, B., Hippier, H. J., Noelle- 
Neumann, E., & Clark, F. (1991). Rating scales: Numeric values may change the meaning of scale labels. Public Opinion 
Quarterly. 55, 570-582. Reprinted by permission.
Whereas 34 percent of the respondents endorsed a value between 0 and 5 on the 0 to 10 scale, 
only 13 percent endorsed one of the formally equivalent values between -5 and 0 on the -5 to +5 
scale. Coding both scales from 0 to 10, this pattern resulted in mean ratings of M = 6.4 on the 0 to 
10, but M =  7.3 on the -5 to + 5  version of the scale. In addition, an inspection of the distributions 
along both scales indicated that the responses were dislocated towards the high end of the -5 to + 5  
scale, as compared to the 0 to 10 scale. This is also reflected in markedly different standard 
deviations, sd’s = 1.03 and .56 for the 0 to 10 and -5 to + 5  scale, respectively.
Subsequent experiments (Schwarz et al., 1991) indicated that the impact of numeric values 
is mediated by differential interpretations of the ambiguous endpoint label "not at all successful''. 
When this label is combined with the numeric value "0", respondents interpret it to refer to the 
absence of noteworthy success. However, when the same label is combined with the numeric value 
"-5", they interpret it to refer to the presence of explicit failure. This differential interpretation reflects 
that a minus-to-plus format emphasizes the bipolar nature of the dimension that the researcher has in 
mind, implying that one endpoint label refers to the opposite of the other. Hence, "not at all 
successful" is interpreted as reflecting the opposite of success, that is, failure. In contrast, a rating 
scale format that presents only positive values suggests that the researcher has a unipolar dimension 
in mind. In that case, the scale values reflect different degrees of the presence of the crucial feature. 
Hence, "not at all successful'1 is now interpreted as reflecting the mere absence of noteworthy success, 
rather than the presence of failure. This differential interpretation of the same term as a function of 
its accompanying numeric value also affects the inferences that judges draw on the basis of a report 
given along a rating scale. For example, in a follow-up experiment (Schwarz et al., 1991, Experiment 
3), a fictitious student reported his academic success along one of the described scales, checking either 
a "-4" or a formally equivalent "2". As expected, judges who were asked to estimate how often this 
student had failed an exam assumed that he failed twice as often when he checked a "-4" than when 
he checked a "2", although both values are formally equivalent along the rating scales used.
In combination, these findings illustrate that "even the most unambiguous words show a range 
of meaning, or a degree of ‘semantic flexibility’, (...) that is constrained by the particular context in 
which these words occur" (Woll, Weeks, Fraps, Pendergrass, & Vanderplas, 1980, p. 60). Assuming 
that all contributions to an ongoing conversation are relevant, respondents turn to the context of a 
word to disambiguate its meaning, much as they would be expected to do in daily life. In a research 
situation, however, the contributions of the researcher include apparently formal features of 
questionnaire design, rendering them an important source of information of which respondents make 
systematic use (see Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, in press; Schwarz & Hippier, 1991, for more detailed 
discussions). Far from demonstrating superficial and meaningless responding, findings of this type
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indicate that respondents systematically exploit the information available to them in an attempt to 
understand their task and to provide a meaningful answer.
At the same time, these findings emphasize that researchers must be sensitive to the 
informational implications of their research instrument to use them to their advantage. For example, 
the present findings suggest that rating scales that provide a continuum from negative to positive 
values may indicate that the researcher has a bipolar conceptualization of the respective dimension 
in mind, whereas scales that present only positive values may indicate a unipolar conceptualization. 
If so, the choice of numeric values may either facilitate or dilute the polarity implications of the 
endpoint labels that are provided to respondents. Accordingly, researchers may be well advised to 
match the numeric values that they provide to respondents with the intended conceptualization of the 
underlying dimension as uni- or bipolar.
2. Frequency Scales
A related l ine of research explored the impact of response alternatives on behavioral frequency 
reports (see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Hippier, 1987, for reviews). In survey research, respondents 
are typically asked to report the frequency with which they engage in a behavior by checking the 
appropriate value from a set of frequency response alternatives provided to them. Again, the range 
o f response alternatives may serve as a source of information for respondents. Specifically, 
respondents assume that the researcher constructed a meaningful scale that reflects his or her 
knowledge about the distribution of the behavior. Accordingly, values in the middle range of the scale 
are assumed to reflect the "average" or "typical" behavior, whereas the extremes of the scale are 
assumed to correspond to the extremes of the distribution. These assumptions influence respondents’ 
interpretation of the question, their behavioral reports, and related judgments.
Question interpretation. Suppose, for example, that respondents are asked to indicate how 
frequently they were "really irritated'1 recently. Before the respondent can give an answer, he or she 
must decide what the researcher means by "really irritated". Does this refer to major irritations such 
as fights with one’s spouse or does it refer to minor irritations such as having to wait for service in 
a restaurant? If the respondent has no opportunity to ask the interviewer for clarification, or if a well- 
trained interviewer responds, "Whatever you feel is really irritating", he or she might pick up some 
pertinent information from the questionnaire. One such piece of information may be the frequency 
range provided by the scale.
For example, respondents who are asked to report how often they are irritated on a scale 
ranging from "several times daily" to "less than once a week" may relate this frequency range to their 
general knowledge about the frequency of minor and major annoyances. Assuming that major
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annoyances are unlikely to occur "several times a day", they may consider instances of less severe 
irritation to be the target of the question than respondents who are presented a scale ranging form 
"several times a year" to "less than once every three months". Experimental data support this 
assumption (Schwarz, Strack, Müller, & Chassein, 1988). Respondents who reported their experiences 
on the former scale, subsequently reported less extreme examples of annoying experiences than 
respondents who were given the latter scale. Thus, the type of annoying experiences that respondents 
reported was determined by the frequency range of the response alternatives in combination with 
respondents’ general knowledge, rather than by the wording of the question per se. Accordingly, the 
same question combined with different frequency scales is likely to assess different experiences.
Theoretically, the impact of the response alternatives on respondents’ interpretation of the 
question should be the more pronounced the less clearly the target behavior is defined. For this 
reason, questions about subjective experiences may be particularly sensitive to the impact of response 
alternatives because researchers usually refrain from providing a detailed definition of the target 
experience so as not to interfere with its subjective nature. Ironically, assessing the frequency of a 
behavior with precoded response alternatives may result in doing just what is avoided in the wording 
of the question.
Frequency estimates. Even if the behavior under investigation is reasonably well defined, 
however, the range of response alternatives may strongly affect respondents’ frequency estimates. 
This reflects that mundane behaviors of a high frequency, such as watching TV for example, are not 
represented in memory as distinct episodes (see Bradbum, Rips, & Shevell, 1987; Schwarz, 1990, 
for reviews). Rather, the various episodes blend together in a generic representation of the behavior 
that lacks temporal markers. Accordingly, respondents cannot recall the episodes to determine the 
frequency of the behavior but have to rely on an estimation strategy (see Menon, in press, for a more 
detailed discussion). In doing so, they may use the range of the scale presented to them as a frame 
of reference. This results in higher frequency estimates along scales that present high rather than low 
frequency response alternatives.
The results of a study on TV consumption, shown in Table 3, illustrate this effect (Schwarz, 
Hippier, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985, Experiment 1). In this study, 37.5 percent of a quota sample of 
German adults reported watching TV for 2.5h or more a day, when presented the high frequency 
response alternatives shown in Table 3, whereas only 16.2 percent reported doing so when presented 
the low frequency response alternatives.
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Table 3: Reported Daily TV Consumption as a Function of Response Alternatives
Reported Daily TV Consumption
Low Frequency High Frequency
Alternatives Alternatives
Up to 1/2 h 7.4% Up to 2 l/2h 62.5%
1/2 h to lh 17 7% 2 l/2h to 3h 23.4%
lh to 1 l/2h 26,5% 3h to 3 l/2h 7.8%
1 I/2h to 2h 14.7% 3 l/2h to 4h 4.7%
2h to 2 l/2h 17.7% 4h to 4 l/2h 1.6%
More than 2 l/2h 16.2% More than 4 1 /2h 0.0%
Note. N =  132. Adapted from Schwarz, N ,p Hippier, H.J., Deutsch, B., & Stracfc, F, (1985), Response scales: Effects of 
category range on reported behavior and comparative judgments. Public Opinion Quarterly. 49, 388-395, Reprinted by 
permission.
Not surprisingly, respondents’ reliance on the frame of reference suggested by the response 
alternatives increases as their knowledge about relevant episodes decreases (Schwarz & Bienias, 
1990), or the complexity of the judgmental task increases (Bless, Bohner, Hild, & Schwarz, 1992). 
More importantly, however, the impact of response alternatives is completely eliminated when the 
informational value of the response alternatives is called into question. For example, telling 
respondents that they participate in a pretest designed to explore the adequacy of the response 
alternatives, or informing student subjects that the scale was taken from a survey of the elderly, wiped 
out the otherwise obtained impact of response alternatives (Schwarz & Hippier, unpublished data). 
Again, these findings illustrate that respondents assume the researcher to be a cooperative 
communicator, whose contributions are relevant to the ongoing conversation, unless the implicit 
guarantee of relevance is called into question.
Comparative judgments. In addition, the frequency range of the response alternatives has been 
found to affect subsequent comparative judgments. Given the assumption that the scale reflects the 
distribution of the behavior, checking a response alternative is the same as locating one’s own position 
in the distribution. Accordingly, respondents extract comparison information from their own location 
on the response scale and use this information in making subsequent comparative judgments.
For example, checking 2h on the low frequency scale shown in Table 3 implies that a 
respondent’s TV consumption is above average, whereas checking the same value on the high 
frequency scale implies that his or her TV consumption is below average. As a result, respondents 
in the Schwarz et al. (1985) studies reported that TV plays a more important role in their leisure time 
(Experiment 1), and described themselves as less satisfied with the variety of things they do in their 
leisure time (Experiment 2), when they had to report their TV consumption on the low rather than
on the high frequency scale (see also Schwarz & Scheuring, 1988). Moreover, these frame of 
reference effects are not limited to respondents themselves, but influence the users of their reports 
as well. For example, in a study by Schwarz, Bless, Bohner, Harlacher, and Kellenbenz (1991, 
Experiment 2) experienced medical doctors considered having the same physical symptom twice a 
week to reflect a more severe medical condition when "twice a week" was a high rather than a low 
response alternative on the symptoms checklist presented to them.
3. Conclusions
Findings of the type reviewed in this section are usually considered measurement "artifacts'’. 
From a conversational point of view, however, they simply reflect that respondents bring the 
assumptions that govern the conduct of conversations in daily life to the research situation. Hence, 
they assume that every contribution is relevant to the goal of the ongoing conversation -  and in a 
research situation, these contributions include apparently formal features of the questionnaire, such 
as the numeric values presented as part of a rating scale or the response alternatives presented as part 
of a frequency question. As a result, the scales used are all but "neutral" measurement devices. 
Rather, they constitute a source of information that respondents actively use in determining their task 
and in constructing a reasonable answer. While research methodologists have traditionally focused 
on the information that is provided by the wording of the question, we do need to pay equal attention 
to the information that is conveyed by apparently formal features of the questionnaire.
IV. Making One’s Contribution Informative
So far, the reviewed research illustrated how many apparent biases and shortcomings in human 
judgment or artifacts in opinion measurement may, in part, be traced to the implicit guarantee of 
relevance that characterizes human communication. However, the maxims of cooperative 
communication do not only determine recipients’ use of the information provided by speakers. Rather, 
they also determine what information the recipient of a question is expected to provide in turn. 
Specifically, cooperative speakers are supposed to provide information that is relevant to the goal of 
the conversation. This not only implies that the provided information should be substantively related 
to the topic of the conversation. Rather, it also implies that the provided information should be new 
to the recipient (Clark & Clark, 1977). Hence, the utterance should not reiterate information that the 
recipient already has, or may take for granted anyway. Accordingly, determining which information 
one should provide requires extensive inferences about the information that the recipient already has 
to identify what is, or is not, "informative".
As was the case for information (inadvertently) provided by the researcher, conversational
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rules that govern the selection of information to be provided by research participants underlie many 
apparently surprising findings in social and psychological research, ranging from the impact of open 
versus closed question formats to children’s performance on Piagetian conservation tasks or the use 
and disuse of easily accessible information in making a judgment.
A. What Is Informative? The Impact of Open versus Closed Question Formats
To answer a question, speakers have to determine what information they are to provide. 
Suppose that you are asked to report what you have done today. Most likely, you would not include 
in your report that you took a shower, that you dressed, and so on. If these activities were included 
in a list of response alternatives, however, you would probably endorse them. This thought 
experiment reflects a set of standard findings from the survey methodology literature (see Schwarz 
& Hippier, 1991, for a review).
Experimental studies on the impact of open- and closed-response formats have consistently 
demonstrated that open- and closed-response formats yield considerable differences in the marginal 
distribution as well as the ranking of items (e.g., Bishop, Hippier, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988; 
Schuman & Presser, 1977). On the one hand, any given opinion is less likely to be volunteered in 
an open-response format than to be endorsed in a closed-response format, if presented. On the other 
hand, opinions that are omitted from the set of response alternatives in a closed format are unlikely 
to be reported at all, even if an "other" category is explicitly offered, which respondents in general 
rarely use (Bradburn, 1983; Molenaar, 1982). Several processes are likely to contribute to these 
findings.
Most importantly, respondents are unlikely to spontaneously report, in an open-answer format, 
information that seems self-evident or irrelevant. In refraining from these responses they follow the 
conversational maxim that an utterance should be informative, as discussed above. This results in an 
underreporting of presumably self-evident information that is eliminated by closed-response formats, 
where the explicit presentation of the proper response alternative indicates the investigator’s interest 
in this information. Moreover, respondents may frequently be uncertain if information that comes to 
mind does or does not belong to the domain of information the investigator is interested in. Again, 
closed-response formats may reduce this uncertainly, resulting in higher responses. Finally, a generic 
"other" response provides little information and would be considered inadequate as an answer in most 
conversations. Hence, it is rarely checked.
In addition, the response alternatives may remind respondents of options that they may 
otherwise not have considered. The methodological literature has typically focused on this latter 
possibility, implying that closed response formats may suggest answers that respondents would never
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think of themselves. This assumption is to some degree supported by the observation that less 
educated respondents are more likely to refuse to answer in an open-response format, but to provide 
an answer in a closed-response format, than well educated respondents (Schuman & Presser, 1981). 
However, a conversational analysis suggests that the obtained differences are more plausibly traced 
to the clarification of the questioner’s interest that is provided by a closed-response format. Most 
importantly, the assumption that respondents may lack the information required for an answer, and 
hence pick one from the response alternatives, may hold to some degree for complex knowledge 
questions, but does not hold for questions about daily activities, such as, "What have you done 
today?" Nevertheless, the same differences are obtained for questions of this type, and they are most 
pronounced for activities that the questioner may take for granted anyway, such as taking a shower 
or having breakfast (see Schwarz, Hippier, and Noelle-Neumann, in press, for a more extended 
discussion).
B. Repeated Questions and Changing Interpretations
That speakers are supposed to provide new information rather than to reiterate information 
the recipient already has, has important implications for the interpretation of questions that are highly 
similar in content or even repeated literally. Unless there is reason to believe that the questioner did 
not understand the answer already given, the person asked is likely to interpret the second question 
as a request for new information. The studies reviewed in this and the following section illustrate 
these shifting interpretations and their impact on respondents’ reports.
1. Experimenters’ Questions and Children’s Cognitive Skills; The Piagetian Conservation Task
Much as researchers’ violations of conversational norms have contributed to overestimations 
of adults’ cognitive biases, they have also contributed to underestimations of children’s cognitive 
skills. Research on the conservation task introduced by Piaget (1952; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) may 
serve as an example. In a typical study (e. g., McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974), a child is shown two 
rows of objects, equal in number and aligned in one-to-one correspondence. When asked, "Is there 
more here or more here, or are both the same number?", the child usually answers that both rows 
are the same in number. Next, the experimenter rearranges the objects in one of the rows to extend 
the row’s length. Following this transformation, the previously asked question is repeated. Many 
young children now respond that there are more objects in the longer row, suggesting that they did 
not master number conservation.
Given that only the perceptual configuration of the crucial row has changed, explanations of 
this phenomenon have typically focussed on children’s susceptibility to perceptual influences.
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However, a conversational analysis of the procedures used proves informative. Why would a speaker 
ask the same question twice within a very short time span, unless he or she inquired about some new 
aspect? And what would that new aspect most likely be, following the deliberate and intentional 
transformation performed by the questioner? As McGarrigle and Donaldson (1974, p. 347) noted, in 
early stages of language acquisition, children use the behavior of a speaker "to arrive at a notion of 
speaker’s meaning and this knowledge is utilized to make sense of the language around” them, much 
as adults use the context of an utterance to disambiguate its meaning. From this perspective, "it could 
be that the experimenter’s simple direct action of changing the length of the row leads the child to 
infer an intention on the experimenter’s part to talk about what he has just been doing. It is as if the 
experimenter refers behaviorally to length although he continues to talk about number" (McGarrigle 
& Donaldson, 1974, p. 343).
To test this assumption, the authors conducted a study in which they varied the apparent 
intentionality of the transformation. Whereas they replicated the above standard procedure in one 
condition, a "naughty teddy bear" appeared in the other and tried to "spoil the game" by rearranging 
the objects, increasing the length of one row. The results provided strong support for a conversational 
account: Whereas only 13 out of 80 children showed number conservation when the experimenter 
manipulated the length of the row, 50 out of the same 80 children showed number conservation when 
the change was due to the apparently unintended interference of "naughty teddy" (see Dockrell, 
Neilson, & Campbell, 1980; Light, Buckingham, & Robbins, 1979, for conceptual replications and 
Donaldson, 1982, for a review). These findings suggest that the children used the behavioral context 
of the question to infer the speaker’s meaning: When "naughty teddy" changed the arrangement of 
the objects, the experimenter may indeed want to know if teddy took an object or if the number 
remained the same. But repeating the previously answered number question makes little sense when 
the experimenter changed the arrangement himself, leading children to infer that the experimenter 
apparently wants to talk about what he did, thus changing the reference of the question from number 
to length.
That the changes in children’s interpretation of the question are indeed driven by 
conversationally inappropriate question reiteration has been nicely demonstrated by Rose and Blank 
(1974). In their study, children were again shown two rows of equal length with the same number 
of objects, but only some of the children had to make an initial judgment at this point. Subsequently, 
the experimenter changed the arrangement, increasing the length of one row. As usual, many of the 
children who had already given a judgment when the rows were equal now reported that the longer 
row has more objects. However, children who had not previously been asked were considerably more 
likely to respond that the number of objects in both rows is the same (see also Siegal, Waters, &
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Dunwiddy, 1988), Clearly, it is not children’s confusion of number and length per se that leads them 
astray. Rather, having already answered the question, the children assume that the experimenter must 
have something else in mind when the question is reiterated. Hence, they respond to their new 
interpretation of the reiterated question, unless asking for the same information twice makes sense, 
as was the case in McGarrigle and Donaldson’s (1974) study.
2. Are "Happiness" and "Satisfaction" the Same Thing?
Much as children have been found to change their interpretation of the same question if 
reiterated within a short time span, adults have been observed to change, or not to change, their 
interpretation of highly similar questions as a function of the conversational context in which the 
questions are posed. For example, Strack, Schwarz, and Wànke (1991, Experiment 2) asked German 
students to rate their happiness and satisfaction with life as a whole along 11-point scales (11 =  "very 
happy" or "very satisfied", respectively). In one condition, both questions were presented at the end 
of the same questionnaire and were introduced by a joint lead-in that read, "Now, we have two 
questions about your life." In the other condition, only the happiness question was presented at the 
end of the questionnaire, introduced by a parallel lead-in, "Now, we have a question about your life. " 
The subsequent rating of life-satisfaction, however, was presented as the first question in a new and 
ostensibly unrelated questionnaire about characteristics of research participants, attributed to a 
different researcher and presented in a different graphic lay-out.
How would these manipulations affect respondents’ interpretation of the two related concepts 
of "happiness" and "satisfaction"? In general, happiness and satisfaction are perceived as closely 
related concepts and both judgments have typically been found to be affected by the same variables 
in studies of subjective well-being (see Schwarz, 1987; Schwarz & Strack, 1991b). However, when 
both questions are presented as part of the same conversational context, interpreting them as nearly 
identical in meaning would result in considerable redundancy. Hence, respondents may infer that the 
researcher intends both questions to tap different aspects of their subjective well-being and may, 
accordingly, draw on different information about their life in making their judgments. Note, however, 
that this does not apply when the questions are asked by two different communicators. In this case, 
both communicators may simply use somewhat different words to refer to the same thing and 
providing identical responses would not violate the norm of nonredundancy, given that each response 
is directed to a different recipient. As a result, the answers given to both questions should be more 
similar when the questions are asked by different researchers rather than by the same researcher.
Strack et al.’s (1991, Experiment 2) findings confirmed this expectation. When both questions 
were asked in ostensibly unrelated questionnaires, subjects’ mean reports of happiness (M = 8.0) and
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satisfaction (M = 8.2) did not differ and both measures correlated r = .96. When both questions 
were presented as part of the same conversational context, however, subjects reported significantly 
higher happiness (M =  8.1) than satisfaction (M =  7.4) and the correlation between both measures 
dropped significantly to r = .75. Apparently, respondents inferred from the conversational relatedness 
of both questions that the researcher must have distinct concepts in mind, as asking the same thing 
twice would make little sense. Accordingly, they presumably based their responses on different 
aspects of their life under this condition, a process that is shown more clearly in the studies reviewed 
in the next section.
C. Avoiding Redundancy in Answering Questions of Differentia! Generality: Its Impact on the 
Use of Highly Accessible Information
In many studies, respondents are asked to answer several related questions that may vary in 
generality. For example, they may be asked how satisfied they are with different specific domains of 
their life, as well as how satisfied they are with their life as a whole. Current theorizing in social 
cognition suggests that answering a specific question increases the accessibility of information used 
to answer it (see Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Higgins, 1989; Martin & Clark, 1990, for reviews). 
Hence, this information should be most likely to come to mind when a related general question is 
asked later on. Depending on the nature of the conversational context, however, using the primed 
information in answering the question may violate the conversational norm of nonredundancy, as 
Strack and Martin (1987) pointed out, following related suggestions by Bradburn (1982) and 
Tourangeau (1984). As a result, conversational processes may determine if easily accessible 
information is, or is not, used in making a judgment, thus determining the emergence of priming 
effects. As the studies reviewed in this section illustrate, the combined operation of cognitive 
accessibility and conversational norms may strongly influence the relationship obtained between two 
judgments, or between a behavioral report and a judgment, leading to dramatically different 
substantive conclusions in social research.
1. General and Specific Judgments: Conversational Norms and the Emergence of Assimilation 
and Contrast Effects
To explore the relationship between related judgments of differential generality, Schwarz, 
Strack, and Mai (1991) asked respondents to report their marital satisfaction as well as their general 
life-satisfaction, varying the order in which both questions were asked. The first column of Table 4 
shows the resulting correlations between marital and life satisfaction. When the life-satisfaction 
question preceded the marital satisfaction question, both measures were moderately correlated, r =
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.32. Reversing the question order, however, increased the correlation to r =  .67. This reflects that 
answering the marital satisfaction question first increased the accessibility of marriage related 
information in memory. As a result, respondents were more likely to consider marriage related 
information in evaluating their life as a whole (see Schwarz & Strack, 1991b, for a judgment model 
of subjective well-being). This interpretation is supported by a highly similar correlation of r =  .61 
when the general question explicitly asked respondents to include their marriage in evaluating their 
overall life-satisfaction.
In a third condition, however, Schwarz et al. deliberately evoked the conversational norm of 
non-redundancy. To do so, both questions were introduced by a joint lead-in that read, "We now have 
two questions about your life. The first pertains to your marital satisfaction and the second to your 
general life-satisfaction." Under this condition, the same question order that resulted in r =  .67 
without a joint lead-in, now produced a low and nonsignificant correlation or r =  .18. This suggests 
that respondents deliberately ignored information that they had already provided in response to a 
specific question when making a subsequent general judgment, If the specific and the general 
questions were assigned to the same conversational context, thus evoking the application of 
conversational norms that prohibit redundancy. In that case, respondents apparently interpreted the 
general question as if it referred to aspects of their life that they had not yet reported on. In line with 
this interpretation, a condition in which respondents were explicitly asked how satisfied they are with 
"other aspects" of their life, "aside from their relationship", yielded a nearly identical correlation of 
r = .20.
In addition, respondents who were induced to disregard their marriage in evaluating their life 
as a whole, either by the conversational context manipulation or by explicit instructions, reported 
higher mean life-satisfaction when they were unhappily married, and lower mean life-satisfaction 
when they were happily married, than respondents who were not induced to exclude this information. 
Thus, contrast effects were obtained when conversational norms elicited the exclusion of the primed 
information from the representation formed of one’s life in general, whereas assimilation effects were 
obtained when the activated information was included in this representation (see Schwarz & Bless’s,
1992, inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects for a more detailed theoretical 
discussion).
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Table 4: Correlation of Relationship Satisfaction and Life-Satisfaclion as a Function of Question Order and 
Conversational Context






with joint lead-in .18 .48*
Specific-general,
explicit inclusion .61* .53*
Specific-general,
explicit exclusion .20 .11
Note. N =  50 per cell, except for "Specific-general with joint lead-in", N =  56. Correlations marked by an asterisk differ 
from chance, £  <  .05. Adapted from Schwarz, N., Strack, F., &. Mai, H.P. (1991). Assimilation and contrast effects in part- 
whole question sequences: A conversational logic analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly. 55. 3-23. Reprinted by permission.
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In a subsequent study, Schwarz and Hippier (unpublished data) observed that the 
conversational norm of non-redundancy may not only be evoked by a joint lead-in, but also by the 
graphic lay-out of a questionnaire. Specifically, the marital satisfaction question and the general 
question were either presented in separate boxes, with a black frame drawn around each question, or 
in a joint box, with one frame drawn around both questions. As in the above data, increasing the 
conversational relatedness of both questions by presenting them in one box significantly reduced the 
otherwise obtained correlation, again illustrating the conversational relevance of apparently formal 
features of questionnaires.
Note, however, that the applicability of the norm of non-redundancy may vary as a function 
of the number of specific questions that precede the more general one. If only one specific question 
precedes the general one, the repeated use of the information on which the answer to the specific 
question was based results in redundancy in the response to the general question. Hence, this repeated 
use of the same information is avoided if both questions are assigned to the same conversational 
context, as the above data demonstrated. Suppose, however, that several specific questions precede
the general one. For example, respondents may be asked to report on their marital satisfaction, their 
job satisfaction, and their leisure time satisfaction before a general life-satisfaction question is 
presented. In that case, they may interpret the general question in two different ways. On the one 
hand, they may assume that it is a request to consider still other aspects of their life, much as if it 
were worded, "Aside of what you already told us,..." On the other hand, they may interpret the 
general question as a request to integrate the previously reported aspects into an overall judgment, 
much as if it were worded, "Taking these aspects together, how satisfied are you with your life-as-a- 
whole?". Note that this interpretational ambiguity of the general question does not arise if only one 
specific question was asked. In that case, an interpretation of the general question in the sense of 
"taking all aspects together" would make little sense because only one aspect was addressed, thus 
rendering this interpretation of the general question completely redundant with the specific one. If 
several specific questions were asked, however, both interpretations of the general question are viable. 
In this case, the interpretation of the general question as a request for a final integrative summary 
judgment is legitimate from a conversational point of view. If several specific questions have been 
asked, an integrative judgment is informative because it does provide "new" information about the 
relative importance of the respective domains, which are in the focus of the conversation. Moreover, 
"summing up" at the end of a series of related thoughts is acceptable conversational practice -  
whereas there is little to sum up if only one thought was offered. Accordingly, respondents may 
interpret a general question as a request for a summary judgment if it is preceded by several specific 
ones, even if all questions are explicitly placed into the same conversational context.
To test this theoretical analysis, other respondents of the Schwarz et al. (1991) study were 
asked three specific questions, pertaining to their leisure time satisfaction, their job satisfaction, and, 
finally, their marital satisfaction. As shown in the second column of Table 4, the correlation between 
marital satisfaction and life-satisfaction increased from r *  .32 to r =  .46 when answering the 
specific questions first brought information about one’s marriage to mind. However, this increase was 
less pronounced than when the marital satisfaction question was the only specific question that 
preceded the general one (r =  .67), reflecting that the three specific question brought a more varied 
set of information to mind. More importantly, introducing the three specific and the general question 
by a joint lead-in, thus assigning them explicitly to the same conversational context, did not reduce 
the emerging correlation, r =  .48. This indicates that respondents adopted a "Taking-all-aspects- 
together" interpretation of the general question if it was preceded by three, rather than one, specific 
questions. This interpretation is further supported by a highly similar correlation of r =  .53 when the 
general question was reworded to request an integrative judgment, and a highly dissimilar correlation 
of r =  .11 when the reworded question required the consideration of other aspects of one’s life.
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In combination, these findings further emphasize that the interpretation of an identically 
worded question may change as a function of conversational variables, resulting in markedly different 
responses. Moreover, the emerging differences are not restricted to the means or margins of the 
response distribution, as social scientists have frequently hoped. Rather, context variables may result 
in different correlational patterns, thus violating the assumption that context effects would be restricted 
to differences in the means, whereas the relationship between variables would be "form resistant" 
(Schuman & Duncan, 1974; Stouffer & DeVinney, 1949).
2. Behavioral Reports and Evaluative Judgments
This conclusion is further supported by a study reported by Strack, Martin, and Schwarz 
(1988) that indicates that the above effects are not restricted to order effects between similar 
evaluative judgments. Rather, the same variables may also affect the observed relationship between 
behavioral reports and subsequent judgments. Specifically, Strack et al. (1988, Experiment 2) asked 
American college students to report their general life-satisfaction as well as their dating frequency. 
When the life-satisfaction question preceded the dating frequency question, the correlation was weak, 
r = -.12, and not significant, suggesting that dating frequency may contribute little to students’ 
overall well-being. Reversing the question order, however, increased the correlation dramatically to 
r = .66. This presumably reflects that the dating frequency question increased the cognitive 
accessibility of dating related information, which was then used in evaluating one’s life as a whole. 
On the substantive side, this correlation would suggest that dating frequency is a major contributor 
to life-satisfaction for college students. However, placing both questions in the same conversational 
context by a joint lead-in again reduced the obtained correlation to non-significance, r =  .15, 
reflecting that respondents ignored the information they had already provided when the conversational 
context elicited the norm of nonredundancy.
3. Conclusions
The findings of the Schwarz et al. (1991) and Strack et al. (1988) studies have methodological 
as well as theoretical implications. On the methodological side, they illustrate that a researcher may 
draw very different substantive conclusions about the contribution of marital happiness or dating 
frequency to individuals’ overall well-being, depending on the order in which the questions are asked. 
To account for the impact of question order, however, it is not sufficient to consider purely cognitive 
variables in isolation. Whereas preceding questions increase the cognitive accessibility of information 
used to answer them, this increase does not necessarily result in an increased use of the primed 
information in making subsequent judgments, in contrast to what current theorizing in social cognition
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would suggest.
According to current models of information accessibility and use (see Bodenhausen & Wyer, 
1987; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Wyer & Srull, 1986), the use of information is determined by its 
accessibility in memory and its applicability to the task at hand. In all of this research, applicability 
has been assumed to be solely determined by the nature of the stimulus materials. As the present 
studies indicate, however, the conversational context may change the perceived nature of the 
judgmental task and may lead subjects to deliberately ignore information that is easily accessible and 
potentially relevant to the judgment at hand. Hence, the emergence of priming effects is not only 
determined by the nature of the stimulus materials or the literal question asked, but also by the 
conversational context in which subjects are asked to make their judgment. As Strack et al. (1988) 
emphasized, a full understanding of the use of highly accessible information therefore requires not 
only a consideration of its applicability to the task at hand, but also of its appropriateness in the 
conversational context (see Martin & Achee, 1992; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Strack, 1992a,b, for 
more general discussions of information use).
V. Conclusions
Social cognition research has typically ignored that assessing a judgment in a research situation is part 
o f an ongoing conversation between the subject and the researcher. In essence, social cognition 
researchers have conceptualized the judge as doing his or her cognitive work in social isolation. In 
many instances, the obtained findings provided a less than flattering portrait of our respondents. 
Apparently, people are happy to offer meaningless opinions on non-existent issues and are biased by 
irrelevant material such as the numeric values of a rating scale or the response alternatives of a 
frequency question. Moreover, they are apparently more than willing to use worthless personality 
information and to ignore more meaningful base-rates, or to draw strong dispositional inferences 
despite obvious situational pressures, and so on. As soon as we conceptualize the assessed judgments 
as part of an ongoing conversation, however, the often dramatic findings seem less surprising. Rather, 
research participants seem to do what they would rightly be expected to do in any other conversation: 
They assume that our utterances as researchers are meaningful, that we do not ask questions about 
things that don’t exist, that we do construct meaningful rather than arbitrary scales, and so on. And 
they try to make sense of our utterances and of our research instruments on the basis of these 
assumptions.
In many cases, people do not lack the ability to make adequate judgments. Rather, what they 
lack is the insight that we as researchers do not live up to the standards that we would typically 
observe in any other conversation that we conduct. They simply give us more credit than we deserve
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by assuming that the information we provide is relevant to the task at hand, truthful, informative and 
clear. Unless we learn to observe these standards in our conduct of research, and in our interpretation 
of results, we may run the risk of painting a rather inadequate picture of human judgment by severely 
overestimating the size and pervasiveness of judgmental biases and shortcomings. Certainly, violations 
of conversational norms are noi the only source of judgmental biases. Like most robust phenomena, 
these biases are likely to be overdetermined, as Ross and Nisbett (1992) emphasized. To fully 
understand their operation in natural contexts, however, we have to ensure that their operation in our 
laboratories does not reflect determinants that are unlikely to be similarly powerful outside of our
Obviously, this concern with possible "side-effects" of research procedures is not new. 
Rather, it has been at the heart of a research tradition concerned with the social psychology of the 
psychological experiment (see Kruglanski, 1975, for an overview). However, following Orne’s (1962, 
1969) seminal discussion of demand characteristics, this research has been guided by the assumption 
that subjects are motivated to look for cues in the experimental situation that provide them with the 
experimenter’s hypothesis. Depending on their motivation to play the role of a "good subject", they 
may then react in line with the suspected hypothesis. Accordingly, most of that early research focused 
on subjects’ motivation to detect and to act according to the experimenter’s hypothesis, rather than 
on the process by which subjects extract information from the research procedures used. In contrast, 
the present analysis suggests that we do not need to make special assumptions about motivations that 
may be germane to the participation in an experiment to account for the reviewed findings. Rather, 
the present analysis indicates that subjects’ behavior in an experiment or research interview is guided 
by the same assumptions and motivations that govern the conduct of conversation in any other setting 
(see Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, in press, for a detailed comparison of Orne’s analysis and a 
conversational perspective). From a conversational point of view, the key difference between 
experiments and conversations in natural settings is only that the experimenter is less likely to comply 
to conversational rules in conducting an experiment than in conducting any other conversation, while 
subjects have no reason to suspect that the experimenter is not a cooperative communicator. As a 
result, they apply the tacit assumptions that usually govern the conduct of conversation to the research 
setting and go beyond the literal information provided to them by drawing inferences on the basis of 
the conversational context.
The apparent biases and errors that subjects commit by relying on conversational maxims are 
less likely to result in mistakes in everyday contexts where communicators try conform to 
conversational norms, provide information that is relevant to the judgment at hand, and make the task 
one that is clear rather than ambiguous -- and where recipients are indeed expected to use contextual
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cues to disambiguate the communication, should the communicator not live up to the ideal. Thus, the 
behavior that may lead to errors in the experimental context may be adaptive in everyday settings. 
As Funder (1987, p. 82) noted in a related context, "it seems ironic that going beyond the information 
given in this way is so often interpreted by social psychologists as symptomatic of flawed judgment. 
Current thinking in the field of artificial intelligence is that this propensity is exactly what makes 
people smarter than computers". To acknowledge this special potential of human information 
processors, social cognition research will need to pay closer attention to the social context in which 
much of our cognitive work is conducted. To do so, social cognition research will eventually need 
to extend the "flowchart model of information processing that presents us only with a unilateral 
input/output paradigm that stops short of reciprocity" (Markus & Zajonc, 1985, p. 212). Taking the 
tacit assumptions that govern the conduct of conversation into account is likely to provide a good 
starting point for this endeavor.
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